Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Salt Lake City v. Tony Emerson : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Todd J. Godfrey; attorney for appellee.
J. Franklin Allred; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Salt Lake v. Emerson, No. 920744 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4737

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN TRE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SAIT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff -Appellee,
Case- No. 920744-CA
(Prioritv 11)

vs.
TONY EMERSON,
Defendant;-Appellant.)

BRIEF OF APPE^LfcE
Interlocutory appeal fcom ?n order denying defendant'&
motion to suppress breath test ^vid<er>ce
The Honorable Sheila K.
ficCIeve, Ihird Circuit Court, Salt Laxe Department. SaiL Lr.ks
County, SLatG of Utah, iscaed the order from which appeal is taken
en October 20, 1992.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50

JMCKErNor-fr»?f¥<*

TODD J. G0DFP2Y 3bQ94
Attorneyf Plr-intif£/AppelJL^e
Asnit-taiit City Prosr.cutor
Salt lake City Corporation
451 South 200 Eript #12b
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 535-77h7

J.rKAITi<"LIN ALLRSD
Attorney, Defendant/Appe]lent
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City., at ah 84102
Telephone

(801)

531.-1930

Ota^

f»*£
Court <*
fltf

U

\SS3

^KlSSfSSStt

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT
I.

4
UTAH LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THE PREPARATION OF A
CHECKLIST AS A PREREQUISITE TO ADMISSIBILITY OF A
BREATH TEST.
4
A.

II.

Utah Administrative Rule R735-500-6 does not
require the preparation of a checklist as a
prerequisite to admissibility of a breath
test.
B.
The statutory structure of Utah's DUI law and
the case law interpreting those statutes does
not require the preparation of a checklist as
a prerequisite to admissibility of a breath
test.
THE FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE RESULT CARDS FROM THE
"DEFICIENT SAMPLE" ATTEMPTED TESTS DOES NOT REQUIRE
SUPPRESSION OF THE COMPLETED TEST AND IS NOT ERROR.

4

6

12
A.

B.

The Utah Administrative Code, Rule 735-5006D(2) does not require that the result cards
from the attempted test be maintained as a
condition of admissibility of the completed
test.
There is no constitutional duty to preserve
the cards from the first two attempted tests,
and the failure of Officer Hatch to retain
those cards is not error.

CONCLUSION

12

14
17

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Arizona v. Youngblood. 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281
(1988)
15
California v. Trotnbetta. 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed. 2d
413 (1984)
15
In Interest of Oaks, 571 P.2d 1364 (1977)
Layton City v. Watson, 733 P.2d 499 (Utah 1987)
Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (1983)

8
12
7

State v. Kost, 785 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1 9 9 0 ) . . . 8
State v. Oveson, 574 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978)

10, 11

State v. Ramirez, 813 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991)

2

State v. Rolison. 733 P.2d 326 (Hawaii App. 1987)

9

State v. Straka, 810 P.2d 888 (Wash. 1991)

16

State v. Vigil, 772 P.2d 469 (Utah App. 1989)

11

OTHER AUTHORITIES
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes §235 (1973)
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes

§250 (1973)

TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 67011-5, §3(b)
Utah Administrative Rule R735-500-6

6, 13
13
8
5, 11, 13

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3 (1953, as amended, 1 9 8 7 ) . . . . 4, 6, 7
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3, (1953, as amended, 1992)

1

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 104

4

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

]•
(

Case No. 920744-CA
(Priority 11)

TONY EMERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.)
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court's jurisdiction is based on Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2) (d) and

(3), (1953, as

amended

1992).

A minute entry was

entered on December 4th, 1992, granting Emerson's petition for
interlocutory review.

A copy of the minute entry is contained in

Addendum A of Appellant's brief.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The City relies on the following statutes:
I.

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3

Standards for chemical breath

analysis- Evidence.
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall
establish standards for the administration of and interpretation of
chemical analysis of a person's breath, including standards of
training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of
a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily

1

prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts,
conditions or events to prove that the analysis was made and the
instrument used was accurate, according to standards established in
Subsection (1), are admissible if:
(a) the judge finds they were made in the regular
course of the investigation at or about the time of
the act and, condition or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and
the method and circumstance of their preparation
indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met,
there is a presumption that the test results are valid and further
foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
II.

Utah Admin. R735-500-6D(2).

Written checklists, outlining the method of properly
performing breath tests shall be available at each location where
tests are given. Test record cards used in conjunction with breath
testing shall be available at each location where tests are given.
Both the checklist and test record card, after completion of a test
should be retained by the operator.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the statutes or administrative regulations of the

State of Utah require the completion of a checklist as a condition
of admissibility of a breath test?
II.

Whether the failure to retain test record cards from two

attempted tests renders a subsequent completed test inadmissible?
The issues presented in this appeal are questions of law,
specifically, questions concerning the admissibility of evidence.
Therefore, the appropriate standard is a "correctness" standard.
State v. Ramirez, 813 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The City accepts the Statement of the case and the Nature of
the proceedings as stated in the Brief of Defendant/Appellant, with
2

one exception.

The City would submit that the Prosecutor, at the

hearing on Emerson's motion to suppress, argued that the failure to
complete a checklist is of no consequence to admissibility, not
that failure to follow the checklist is of no consequence.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The statutes and the regulations of the State of Utah do not
require

the

completion

of

a

checklist

admissibility of a breath test.
applicable

statutes

shows

that

as

a

condition

of

The plain language of the
such

a

requirement

is

not

contemplated by the law.
An Officer's failure to retain the test record cards from two
attempted, but not completed, tests is not a violation of a
suspect's due process rights and there is no statutory authority
that requires the retention of such test record cards.

3

ARGUMENT

I.

UTAH LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THE PREPARATION OF A CHECKLIST AS A
PREREQUISITE TO ADMISSIBILITY OF A BREATH TEST.

Preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence
are

within

relevancy

the

sound

discretion

of

the

court,

of evidence may be conditioned upon

facts. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule
dealing with

chemical

Statutory

provisions

within Utah's DUI statutes in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3

(1953, as

Since the City was

able

tests

of

contained

1987) .

of

the existence

the

are

amended,

the admissibility

104.

although

to

supply

the

proper

factual basis through the testimony of Officer Hatch, the breath
test administered to the Appellant, Emerson, is admissible.

A.

Utah Administrative Rule R735-500-6 does not require the
preparation

of

a

checklist

as

a

prerequisite

admissibility of a breath test.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3 states:
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety shall establish standards for the administration
of and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's
breath, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is
material to prove that a person was operating or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited,
documents offered as memoranda or records of acts,
conditions or events to prove that the analysis was made

4

to

and the instrument used was accurate, according to
standards established in Subsection (1), are admissible
if:
(a) the judge finds they were made in the
regular course of the investigation at or
about the time of the act, condition or event;
and
(b) the source of information from which made
and the method and circumstance of their
preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the
standards
established under Subsection (1) and the conditions of
Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that
the test results are valid and further foundation for
introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
Pursuant to Subsection (1) of §41-6-44.3, the Department of
Public Safety established Utah Administrative Rule R735-500-61,
titled "Program certification."
breath

This rule requires that for a

testing program

to be certified,

it must meet

criteria. Specifically,

it requires that

"[w]ritten

certain

checklists

outlining the method of properly performing breath test shall be
available at each location where tests are given."

Utah Admin.

R735-500-6D(2).
The plain language of R735-500-6D(2) shows that this section
does

not

contemplate

the

preparation

of

a

prerequisite to admissibility of a breath test.

checklist

as

a

In R735-500-6D(2)

the word "shall11 is used to require that checklists and breath test
result cards be available.

The regulation then states that the

checklist and test record card "should" be retained by the Officer,
after

completion

of

a

test.

Elementary

1

rules

of

statutory

At the time of Emerson's arrest, the breath testing
regulations promulgated by the Department of Public Safety were
found in Utah Administrative Code R735-500. In the new version of
the Administrative Code, the regulations are found at R714-500.

5

construction require that when different language is used in
different parts of a statute, it is to be presumed that the
language is used with a different intent. 73 Am. Jur. 2d
§235 (1973) .

Statutes

The use of "shall" is obviously mandatory in this

section of the Regulations. The use of "should" is not mandatory.
If the regulation had been intended to require retention of the
checklist, the mandatory "shall" would have been used.
fact that

"should"

From the

is used in speaking of retention of the

checklist and test result card, it can be deduced

that the

regulations do not require the retention of any document. The City
acknowledges that retention of the result card and checklist is the
better method and certainly suggested by the regulations, but the
only requirement of the regulations is that the checklists and
result cards be available.

B.

The statutory structure of Utah's DUI law and the case
law interpreting those statutes does not require the
preparation

of

a

checklist

as

a

prerequisite

to

admissibility of a breath test.
There is no language, explicit or implied in Utah Code Ann.
§41-6-44.3 that requires the preparation of a checklist to lay
foundation for the admissibility of the breath test.

Subsection

(2) of §41-6-44.3 refers to "documents offered as memoranda or
records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis
was made and the instrument used was accurate."

This section of

§41-6-44.3 refers specifically to affidavits of public officers
6

responsible for the regular testing of the breath testing machines
for accuracy.

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (1983) .

In Murray City, the Supreme Court of this state considered
§41-6-44.3 in relation to a claim that results of a breathalyzer
were admitted in a trial without proper foundation.

Interpreting

the statute, the court found that:
[t]he enactment of §41-6-44.3 evinces an intent by the
Legislature to relieve the State of Utah and other
governmental entities of the financial burden of calling
as a witness in every DUI case the public officer
responsible for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer
equipment.
Murray City at 1320.
Even if this court were to find that the language of §41-644.3 relates to the preparation of checklists and result cards, the
language of Subsection (3) clearly shows that the failure to have
a checklist does not make test results inadmissible.
(3) states that " [i]f the judge finds the

Subsection

... conditions of

Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the test
results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the
evidence is unnecessary." Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3(3) (Emphasis
added).

By specifically noting that

unnecessary"

if

Subsection

(2)

is

"further foundation is
satisfied,

the

statute

contemplates that in those instances where Subsection (2) is not
met, further foundation may be required, as opposed to rendering
the

evidence

inadmissible.

Thus,

upon

proper

foundation,

(testimony indicating that the test was properly administered) , the
test results would still be admissible.
Emerson argues that failure to fill out a checklist cannot be
7

cured by the Officer's testimony that the steps on the checklist
were followed. Emerson cites law from Texas and Hawaii in support
of this proposition.

Utah law is contrary to Emerson's position.

In In Interest of Oaks, 571 P.2d 1364 (1977) , the Utah Supreme
Court dealt with a very similar issue. A minor, Oaks, was arrested
for DUI and given a breathalyzer test.

On the result card the

Officer administering the test had failed to fill in the blanks
identifying the machine and the ampoule used in the test.

Oaks

claimed that the failure to note these numbers was error.

The

Court held that ,f[t]he omission of the number of the machine or of
the ampoule on the test card would not make the testimony of the
expert incompetent.11

Oaks at 1365.

Likewise, Officer Hatch's

failure to completely fill in the test record or to use separate
checklists for each attempted test does not make his testimony
incompetent.
Additionally, the cases Emerson cites in support of his
argument that the alleged deficiencies cannot be cured by testimony
of the Officer do not stand for the cited proposition.

I

n

State v. Kost, 785 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1990), the
court dealt with a situation where a breath test result was
challenged based on the failure of the State's witness to observe
all

of

the requirements

of the Department

of Public Safety

regulations. The testimony of the state's witness was that he did

8

not follow the regulations2 as they were currently stated in the
Texas Administrative Code, but that the "Scientific Director" of
the

State

Department

of

Public

Health

had

changed

those

requirements, even though such change was not noted in the Texas
Administrative Code. The Court held that the "Scientific Director"
did not have the authority to alter the regulations and the
Administrative Code, and that any directive making such change was
not presented in evidence.

For this reason, the results of the

test were suppressed.
The issue before the court was not whether testimony could
cure the defect, but whether the changes alleged were authorized
under law.

Kost is not applicable to Emerson's situation.

Also cited by Emerson is State v. Rolison, 733 P.2d 326
(Hawaii App. 1987).

In Rolison, the issue presented to the court

dealt with the state's failure to present evidence concerning the
regular testing for accuracy of the machine in use. The court held
that because there was no evidence of such testing presented,
foundation was improper.

Rolison did not address the issue of

whether a failure to follow the regulations could be cured by
testimony, because the state never attempted to introduce any
evidence on the question of testing for accuracy. As such, Rolison
2

It is interesting to note that the Texas statutory DUI
scheme differs from Utah's in that TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art.
67011-5, §3(b), (the counterpart of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3),
specifically requires that "[a]nalysis of a specimen of a person's
breath, to be considered
valid
under the provisions of this
section, must be performed according to rules of the Texas
Department of Public Safety ... . Thus, Texas law specifically
requires compliance with the state's administrative code for the
results of a test to admissible in evidence.
9

is not applicable to Emerson's situation.
It is interesting to note that in Rolison, the state argued
that the test result was admissible despite the failure to present
evidence regarding the testing of the machines because a checklist
was followed.

The Court noted that the checklist was not required

by the regulations of the state, but was a creation of the Honolulu
Police Department.
The state cited an Alaska case, State v. Oveson, 574 P.2d 801
(Alaska 1978), for the proposition that a checklist was sufficient
to establish foundation for the breath test.

The Rolison court

found Oveson inapposite because the regulations of Alaska differ
from those of Hawaii.
The Alaska regulations stated

!f

[t]he procedures set forth in

this section shall be followed to obtain and analyze breath samples
by use of the Borkenstein Breathalyzer.
(1)

complete the 'Breathalyzer Operational Checklist'

form ... ."
Oveson at 804 fn 7.
The facts of Oveson are also of interest in Emerson's case.
In Oveson a person arrested for DUI was given a breath test.

As

noted above, Alaska law requires the preparation of an operational
checklist as a condition of a valid test.

In Oveson,

the

checklist was filled out, but one box was left blank. The Officer
who administered the test testified that he completed that step,
but forgot to check the box.

The court denied defendant's motion

to dismiss for failure to complete the checklist.
10

The sole issue

on appeal was the failure to complete the checklist.

The Alaska

Supreme Court held that despite the mandatory statutory language,
the non-compliance with regulatory standards could be cured by
testimony. The court noted that compliance would have entitled the
City

to a presumption

of validity

in their

test, but

noncompliance did not result in inadmissibility.

that

Oveson at 805.

In Emerson's case there is testimony that the steps on the
checklist

were

followed,

and,

contrary

to

Alaska

law,

the

completion of a checklist is not required by the regulations or
statutes of Utah.

As such, Officer Hatch's failure to complete a

checklist for all three attempted tests does not affect the
admissibility of the completed test.
Emerson also cites State v. Vigil, 772 P.2d 469 (Utah App.
1989) for the proposition that the City must demonstrate compliance
with regulatory standards or the breath test is invalid.
like

Murray

City,

supra,

examined

the

requirement

Vigil,
in

the

regulations relating to the periodic testing of the breath test
machines for accuracy. The specific issue in Viail was whether the
prosecution was required to establish "bookends" for the test; i.e.
whether or not the breath test machine must be checked both before
and after the defendant's test to meet foundational requirements.
The Vigil court held that "bookends" were not necessary, following
the literal language of the regulations and refusing to impose a
requirement which was not written into the regulations by the
Department of Public Safety.
What is required by R735-500-6D(2) is that checklists, which
11

"outline the method of properly performing breath tests," be
available at the testing location. That they were available at the
testing point in Emerson's case is evidenced by the fact that a
completed checklist was introduced into evidence at the hearing on
Emerson's motion to suppress.
In summary, it is clear that the law of Utah does not require
the preparation of a checklist as a condition of admissibility of
the breath test.

II.

THE FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE RESULT CARDS FROM THE "DEFICIENT
SAMPLE" ATTEMPTED TESTS DOES NOT REQUIRE SUPPRESSION OF THE
COMPLETED TEST AND IS NOT ERROR.

A police officer has no obligation to help a criminal suspect
gather

exculpatory

evidence,

absent

a

statutorily

or

constitutionally imposed duty. Layton City v. Watson, 733 P.2d 499
(Utah 1987). In the present case, no statute requires that Officer
Hatch preserve the test cards from the attempted tests, and the
failure to maintain the test cards does not violate Emerson's Due
Process rights.

Therefore, the results of the completed breath

test are not inadmissible.

A.

The Utah Administrative Code, Rule 735-500-6D(2),

does not require that the result cards from the attempted
test be maintained as a condition of admissibility of the
12

completed test.
Utah Admin. R735-500-6D(2) states:
[w]ritten checklists, outlining the method of properly
performing breath tests shall be available at each
location where tests are given. Test record cards used
in conjunction with breath testing shall be available at
each location where tests are given. Both the checklist
and test record card, after completion of a test should
be retained by the operator.
Emphasis added.
As noted in Section I, above, elementary rules of statutory
construction require that where different language is used in
different parts of a statute, it is to be presumed that the
language is used with a different intent. 73 Am. Jur. 2d §235. In
this particular situation, the use of "shall" and "should" shows
obviously distinct intent. "Shall" is a mandatory directive, while
should is suggestive. Had the Department of Public Safety intended
that retention of the checklists be mandatory, "shall," could have
been used instead of "should." The use of a different term must be
given affect.
It is also an elementary rule of statutory construction that
a legislative body uses each term in a statute advisedly, and that
each part of a statute has a purpose and should be interpreted
accordingly.

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes

defined by Websters

Ninth

New Collegiate

§250 (1973) .
Dictionary

examination, observation, or evaluation."

"Test" is

as "a critical

The plain language of

R735-500-6D(2) states that the test record card, "after completion
of a test should be retained."

Emphasis added.

In

Emerson's

case, there were apparently two attempted tests before a valid test
13

was completed. Testimony from Officer Hatch at the hearing on the
motion to suppress indicated that the first two attempts were
unsuccessful in that defendant failed to sustain a long enough
breath for the machine to perform any analysis.

(R. 29-31) . From

the definition of "test" given above, it would seem clear that for
a test to take place, there must be some specimen to be examined,
observed or evaluated.

In Emerson's case, there was no such

specimen obtained on the first two attempts because Emerson did not
provide enough breath for the machine to analyze.

The plain

language of the regulation suggests retention of the test card only
upon "completion" of a test. The first two attempts at a test with
Mr. Emerson did not result in completed tests. Therefore, even if
the court were to go beyond the plain language of the regulations
and require retention of the result card, Officer Hatch would not
be required to maintain the cards from the first two incomplete
tests. The third card, from the completed test was retained by the
Officer, and is available for inspection.

B.

There is no constitutional duty to preserve the

cards from the first two attempted tests, and the failure
of Officer Hatch to retain those cards is not error.
Whatever

duty

the

Constitution

imposes

on

States

and

prosecution agencies to preserve evidence, that duty is limited to
evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the
suspect's

defense.

To

meet

a

constitutional

standard

of

materiality, evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that
14

was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a
nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
evidence by other reasonably available means.

California v.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed. 2d 413 (1984),
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281
(1988) . The test cards from the attempted tests in Emerson's case
have no apparent exculpatory value, and either party present during
the attempted tests has the opportunity to present evidence through
testimony concerning the events.
In his brief, Emerson has made no attempt to characterize the
attempted test cards as exculpatory.

Instead, he speaks only of

the safeguard of preserving the evidence so that it might be
reviewed by an expert for "irregularities or exculpatory results."
Brief of Appellant at p. 10.

Youngblood dealt with a situation

where the evidentiary value of the lost evidence was unknown.

In

Youngblood, the defendant was convicted of child molestation,
sexual assault and kidnapping. The state failed to preserve semen
samples from the victim's body and clothing.

The Court held that

unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the
police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law.

Youngblood at 58, 109

S.Ct. at 337. (Emphasis added).
In a situation more on point with Emerson's case, the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington dealt with a similar issue in
State v. Straka, 810 P.2d 888 (Wash. 1991).

In Straka, similarly

situated defendants argued that their due process rights were
15

violated when the state failed

to preserve

"invalid sample"

messages which appeared on the breath test machine screen.

The

evidence showed that an inordinately high number of such messages
were appearing on machines and in the State's data base which
recorded all tests taken.
Defendant's argued that the evidence at issue was not unknown
or speculative evidence which might conceivably be of significance,
but was actual evidence that the prosecution's only evidence of
breath alcohol was inaccurate, and thus, Younablood did not apply.
Straka at 900.

The court disagreed with defendants' argument,

noting:
[t]he invalid sample messages are not directly related to
guilt or innocence. Their relationship is tangential at
best in that, as defendants acknowledge, any record of
occurrences would be used in an attempt to discredit the
reliability of breath test results.
Any record of
invalid sample occurrences could not directly serve to
confirm or deny particular breath test results.
Straka at 901.
Likewise, the attempted test cards in Emerson's case are not
exculpatory. They could only be used to discredit the machine, not
to confirm or deny particular breath results.

Additionally the

City's ability to show that the machine was in proper working order
at the time of Emerson's test has not been called into question.
Finally, even if the court were to find that preservation of
the attempted test cards were constitutionally or statutorily
required, the proper remedy would be suppression of the evidence
concerning the attempted tests, not suppression of the completed
tests.

The foundation for the completed test should not be in
16

question.

Requiring suppression of the completed test would lead

to a result which prohibited an officer from retaking a test to
cure a mistake or deficiency in the first attempt.

Such a result

is clearly not reasonable and is not contemplated by law.

CONCLUSION

For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the City requests
that defendant's appeal should be denied, and the ruling of the
trial court affirmed, with the case remanded for trial on the
merits.
Respectfully submitted this ^f^ILrday of May, 1993.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Todd J. Godfrey, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to be delivered to the
Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102, and four copies to J. Franklin All red,
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102, on this /Pft-

day of May, 1993.
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or Defendant
600 East
City, utah 6 4 102
(801) 531-1990

IN ' HE THIRD CIRCUIT CCURT IN AND FCR SALT

AKE ' OIWTY

STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMEr ."
)

SALT LAKE CITY,

)
)

MOTION TO SUPPRESS 'V.DENCE
AND NOTICE OF HEART -G

Flaintiff,
vs.

)

)
TONY EMEF. -ON,

Judae

Sheila \. Mc l^ve

)

)

Case No.

925( 14647 T<

Defendant
The defendant accve named hereby :?.oves the c- urt \ >r an Order
Suppressing the breath test evidence in the above entit'e-i case on
the grour is and for the reasons that applicable pr -cedu: ^s were net
complied

/ith in the creation of the test.

WHEf TORE, the Defendant prays that the sam» be i: -p )ressed.
DATI ) this J S 2 ^ r dav

/
/J. FRANKLIN AI LRED
Attorney for \ ne De "e,idant

,, T

*;o "
NOTI

:\ T:fM :;:..; :NT:rr

rv

AL::\*E N A M E D

AND T O

IT»S

ATTORNEY

CHEF

You ; p.ci each cl you will please Notice that the
Metier, to S'dpccess

the breath

test

evidence

L

LUKE:

e 1 endant f s

w 11 c :TH on

for

rearing be tore the honorable Judge Sheila McCleve, in hp • Courtroom
in the Third Circuit Court Salt Lake Department or Tues .a\ , August
25, 1992, at the hour of 2:00 p.m.

Of the foregoing,

lease take

notice arc govern '/ourselves accordingly.
DATE:

yOA—

this

day cf J u l y ,

I99_2.
s

s.

J/franklin

Al Lred
Attorney for t le De erdant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of th •+ cregoing
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

EVIDENCE AND NOTICE OF KEAFENG,

postage prepaid to:
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
221 Last 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
DATE:» this

c

g*?

a ay of July, 19

v* 5 mailed

FILED
«. . r.vJ'.",-iIJ nwi_r.^lJ, P . C . * A 0 0 5 o

OCT 2 0 1592

Attorney fcr Defendant

:;.: scut:-, ec: E^t
Salt Lai-'.e City, utan 84 102
Tulosr.cr.e:
(-C1) 521-199C

y THE THIRD CIRCUIT, CCUR:

* ;I

/-i. t ^

r u :\

SALT

,:

's.wj.i:i

CRC::? ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
ret

SALT LAKE CITY,
:

laintif f,

vs .

'udce Sheila McCleve
Case No. 9 2 5014647TC

The Motion of -he Defendant above nar.ed to suppress the breath
test evidence

in the above entitled

case cane en regularly for

hearing before tru Honorable Sheila MtCleve in her courtroom in
the Salt Lake Circuit en Tuesday, August 25, 1992, at the hour of
2: CO

p.r..

testimony

was

received

and

counsel

argued>

their

respective positions and having rested and the Court being fully
advised and having consider the matter, now therefore, makes the
^ f* * ^ r^i • * ••* r*

Pi v ^ a >* •

CRTI?.
The Motion of the Defendant to Suocress the Evidence is
denied.
DATED this

zo -4-day

of October, 1992.
BY^THE COURT

c
Sheila McCleve
ICtfcuit Court Judae

<-*_

I hereby - c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e ar: c o r r e c t copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g
CREEP., was r.aiied postage prepaid t.c :
Q

•» •

<-«-»

T

1

£*nn

, i

r,

: PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
SOUTH
. I .

.IS

w - nT.

C h i l l

